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Abstract
If a child asks a friend to play football and the friend replies, ‘I have a cough’, the 
requesting child must make a ‘relevance inference’ to determine the communicative 
intent. Relevance inferencing is a key component of pragmatics, that is, the ability 
to integrate social context into language interpretation and use. We tested which 
cognitive skills relate to relevance inferencing. In addition, we asked whether children’s 
lab-based pragmatic performance relates to children’s parent-assessed pragmatic 
language skills. We tested 3.5- to 4-year-old speakers of British English (Study 1: N = 
40, Study 2: N = 32). Children were presented with video-recorded vignettes ending 
with an utterance requiring a relevance inference, for which children made a forced 
choice. Study 1 measured children’s Theory of Mind, their sentence comprehension 
and their real-world knowledge and found that only real-world knowledge retained 
significance in a regression analysis with children’s relevance inferencing as the outcome 
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variable. Study 2 then manipulated children’s world-knowledge through priming but 
found this did not improve children’s performance on the relevance inferencing task. 
Study 2 did, however, reveal a significant correlation between children’s relevance 
inferencing and a measure of morpho-syntactic production. In both studies parents 
rated their children’s pragmatic language usage in daily life, which was found to relate 
to performance in our lab-based relevance inferencing task. This set of studies is the 
first to empirically demonstrate that lab-based measures of relevance inferencing are 
reflective of children’s pragmatic abilities ‘in the wild’. There was no clear association 
between relevance inferencing and Theory of Mind. There was mixed evidence for 
the role of formal language, which should be further investigated. Finally, real-world 
knowledge was indeed associated with relevance inferencing but future experimental 
work is required to test causal relations.
Keywords
Implicature, inference, relevance, real-world knowledge, Theory of Mind, pre-school, 
individual differences, priming, typical development
Introduction
Children encounter indirect use of language on a daily basis. Imagine a child asks a 
friend to play football with him and the friend replies that he has a cough. To interpret 
this reply as an indirect refusal, the child must infer that ‘I have a cough’ is somehow 
relevant to the current ‘question under discussion’ in the conversation and use this to 
determine the implied meaning (e.g. Benz & Jasinskaja, 2017). For this reason, some 
theorists have referred to successful interpretation of this type of indirect language as 
‘relevance inferencing’ (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Although theorists differ regarding 
their views on the specific mechanics of this sense-making process (e.g. Grice, 1975; 
Searle, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Tomasello, 2008), they agree that the basis is an 
assumption by the listener that speakers communicate co-operatively.
Children hear – and appear to successfully interpret – some forms of indirect speech 
from a fairly early age (e.g. Shatz, 1978). For example, a parent may ask a child ‘Can you 
shut the door’ rather than imperatively demanding her to ‘Shut the door’. Children below 
the age of 2 years respond appropriately to the interrogative request by carrying out the 
action (as opposed to interpreting the parent as querying their ability to shut the door). 
More implicit indirect speech that requires a relevance inference (e.g. replying ‘You’ve 
had a lot of biscuits already’ to a child’s request for a biscuit) is understood only later in 
development. That is, children appear to have difficulty with such context-dependent 
interpretation of indirect speech until around the age of 6 years (e.g. Bernicot et al., 2007; 
Bucciarelli et al., 2003; see also Verbuk & Shultz, 2010). However, with a more goal-
directed design (i.e. giving a puppet what she/he wants), Schulze et al. (2013: Study 3) 
found that even at 36 months, children were able to compute the required relevance infer-
ences and successfully interpreted others’ communicative acts 66% of the time overall 
(see also Schulze & Buttelmann, 2021, regarding the trajectory up until and including 
5 years of age). In Schulze et al.’s (2013: Study 3) paradigm, children saw vignettes of 
two puppets engaging in a short dialogue, as in (1) below:
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(1) Puppet Anna:  ‘Oh, I slept really well’.
 Puppet Becky:  ‘I’m really hungry. I’d like to have breakfast’
  E1 [sitting with child]: “Look, I have cereal or toast. You can give one to the puppets. I’ll 
ask them what they’d like to have.
 E1 [to puppets]:  ‘Do you want cereal or toast?’
 Puppet Anna:  ‘The milk’s all gone’
 E1: [to child]:  “Which one will you give to the puppets?
Three-year-old children assumed Anna’s utterance was relevant to the object choice, 
and inferred that Anna did not want the cereal (given that there was no milk) and thus 
handed her the toast.
Our focus
The main focus of this study is on investigating which cognitive skills relate to children’s 
ability to successfully compute relevance inferences. Specifically, we were interested in 
investigating the role of world knowledge, which has previously been stated as an impor-
tant factor (e.g. in terms of common ground) but has not previously been investigated in 
relation to relevance inferencing or comprehension of communicative intent. In addition, 
we also ask whether lab-based measures of relevance inferencing relate to children’s 
parent-reported pragmatic language abilities. This is a crucial step since we need to know 
which cognitive resources are related to the ability to interpret indirect language in daily 
interactions. Lab-based judgements are likely to underestimate children’s inferencing 
ability ‘in the wild’ since these types of lab tasks require children to process and remem-
ber conversation between two protagonists and are never likely to be as intrinsically 
motivating for a child as would be naturalistic dialogue (see also Papafragou & Tantalou, 
2004, for additional points).
Cognitive and socio-cognitive correlates of relevance inferencing
Of the many cognitive resources that might be important for processing relevance infer-
ences, theoretical attention has been focused on (1) Theory of Mind (which is the ability to 
understand the desires, perspectives, emotions, knowledge and beliefs of others and how 
they may differ from one’s own; see Wellman, 2014); (2) formal language ability (i.e. the 
comprehension and production of vocabulary and grammar); and (3) real-world knowl-
edge. One difficulty with testing relationships between these cognitive resources and infer-
encing is that they, in turn, tend to be correlated with each other at least to some extent. For 
example, Theory of Mind tests are positively correlated – usually with a moderate to large 
effect size – with general language ability (see, for example, Milligan et al., 2007, for a 
meta-analysis). This relationship is likely to be at least in part due to the fact that Theory of 
Mind measures require the child to process and remember the verbal information of a 
vignette, including information about which protagonist likes or knows which things. But 
it is also likely to reflect the fact that we often learn about other minds in linguistic 
exchanges. We bear this in mind while reviewing the background empirical literature.
With regard to children’s Theory of Mind, studies examining the relationship with 
the ability to compute relevance inference have yielded mixed results. On one hand, 
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Huang et al. (2015) found that school-aged children’s performance on ‘indirect reproach’ 
interpretation (e.g. ‘Are you leaving without tidying up’?) was significantly higher for chil-
dren who passed Theory of Mind tasks than for children who had failed (see also Whyte & 
Nelson, 2015). On the other hand, De Mulder (2015) found that the pre-schoolers’ compre-
hension of indirect requests (e.g. ‘It’s really cold outside’ said by a mother to a child who is 
about to go play outside) does not relate to Theory of Mind when formal language is con-
trolled for. One of our current aims was to follow up these findings by investigating the 
relationship between Theory of Mind and children’s ability to make relevance inferences.
Second, for language proficiency, there seems to be ample evidence that formal lan-
guage skills are related to a range of pragmatic language functions in both typically and 
atypically developing children (see Matthews et al., 2018, for a review). In one sense, 
such relationships are not surprising since it would be impossible to take a speaker’s 
perspective and communicative intent into account in order to interpret language if one 
had not yet acquired the words and morpho-syntax involved. However, it is also highly 
plausible that the relationship between formal language and pragmatics is much deeper 
than this. Indeed, a number of theorists have suggested that formal language itself can 
only be acquired if a child has the ability to consider communicative intent (e.g. H. H. 
Clark, 1996; Tomasello, 2008) or even that there exists no real distinction between for-
mal language and pragmatic language since linguistic forms (speech sounds, syntactic 
structures, etc) are used to perform both semantic and pragmatic functions (E. V. Clark, 
1990; see Matthews et al., 2018, for a discussion).
Certainly, in the literature on children’s inferencing abilities more broadly, formal 
language has been found to play a hugely important role. This is particularly the case for 
the literature on the inferences required when comprehending narratives, such as bridg-
ing inferences, coherence inferences and anaphor resolution (Currie & Cain, 2015; 
Davies et al., 2020; Lucas & Norbury, 2015). Furthermore, De Mulder (2015) found 
that syntax comprehension predicted children’s comprehension of indirect requests.
However, a number of studies have not found significant relationships between for-
mal language and implicatures or relevance inferencing. Antoniou and Katsos (2017) 
found no relation between children’s performance on a range of pragmatic phenomena 
and their performance in a test of expressive vocabulary (see also Antoniou et al., 2019 
for similar results). Huang et al. (2015) tested children’s receptive vocabulary and found 
no relation to their interpretation of indirect reproaches. Similarly, Schulze et al. (2020) 
found no relationship between children’s interpretation of relevance implicatures and 
their receptive vocabulary. Therefore, in these current studies, we also included measures 
of formal language to investigate whether there is a relationship with relevance inferenc-
ing skills in 3-year-olds.
Third, real-world knowledge is logically necessary for most inferencing (e.g. Kintsch, 
1988). That is, to correctly interpret ‘I have a cough’ as a refusal, the child needs to know 
that people generally do not feel like running around energetically when they have 
coughs. There is evidence suggesting that relevant background knowledge is crucial for 
inferencing skills more generally (e.g. Marr & Gormley, 1982; see also Ackerman et al., 
1990). However, other studies on coherence inferencing in narratives found that although 
requisite knowledge is necessary, it is not sufficient for inferencing (Barnes et al., 1996). 
Therefore, another key aim of these current studies was to investigate whether children 
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with a higher level of world knowledge would find it easier on the whole to compute 
relevance inferences.
Thus, we wished to examine the relationship between these three factors (Theory of 
Mind, formal language and real-world knowledge) and lab-based measures of relevance 
inferencing. In addition, we also wished to confirm the validity of a lab-based measure 
of relevance inferencing by determining its relationship with parent-assessments of prag-
matic language.
Current studies
We carried out two studies to assess how young children compute relevance inferences. 
For both studies, we used an adapted version of Schulze et al.’s (2013: Study 3) Relevance 
Inferencing paradigm. This paradigm has been successfully used with German-speaking 
and Swiss–German speaking children aged 36 months and above (see also Schulze & 
Buttelmann, 2021; Schulze et al., 2020). To respond, participants merely have to observe 
and choose between two objects – or between two pictures on a screen in more recent 
versions of the paradigm (e.g. Schulze & Buttelmann, 2021) – by making an inference as 
to which object the protagonist wants based on her indirect speech (i.e. relevance impli-
cature). This method was preferred since a pilot study with school-aged children, sum-
marised in Appendix A in supplemental material, suggested that sentence-length response 
options might over-burden formal language. We thus presented children with video-
recorded vignettes of a short dialogue, ending in an indirect use of language which 
required a relevance inference for successful interpretation. Both studies used forced-
choice behavioural measures of children’s relevance inferencing.
RQ1. Our first research question concerned the cognitive correlates of child rele-
vance inferencing. Study 1 addressed the question of which key cognitive abilities 
were involved in children’s communicative abilities, testing the relation with for-
mal language, real-world knowledge and Theory of Mind. Study 2 further explored 
the role of real-world knowledge by experimentally manipulating children’s knowl-
edge through priming.
RQ2. Our second research question was whether lab-based judgement measures of 
relevance inferencing are ecologically valid. To this end, in both studies, we asked 
parents to complete a brief questionnaire about their children’s conversation skills and 
examined the relationship with the lab-based assessment.
Study 1
Method
Participants. We tested 48 monolingual English-speaking, typically developing children. 
Children were recruited through the Kent Child Development Unit in southern England. 
We pre-excluded any children who either had hearing or possible speech and language 
difficulties. Parents brought their children to the Kent Child Development Unit’s testing 
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suite. Some parents remained in the waiting room whereas others sat behind their chil-
dren and were requested not to speak. Five children were tested but excluded because 
they showed a side bias; that is, they pointed to the same side for all six trials. Three 
children were excluded due to technical error. The final sample comprised 40 children 
aged between 41 and 48 months (Mean age = 44.6 months, SD = 2.1), of whom 16 were 
boys. Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology ethics committee at 
the University of Kent, UK. Children were told that they could take a break whenever 
they wished and could end testing entirely if they desired.
Overall procedure
All children saw a relevance inferencing task consisting of six trials, followed by a 
Theory of Mind measure, the ‘Sentences Structures’ sub-test of the CELF-P (Wiig et al., 
2006), and the ‘Information’ sub-test of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence (WPPSI, Wechsler, 2012). Parents completed the Mindful Conversational 
Difficulties Scale (De Rosnay et al., 2014) to assess children’s everyday communication 
capacities. The testing session lasted 45 minutes in total, including a 10-minute ‘free 
play’ break in the middle. The test performance was video-recorded.
Relevance inferencing measure
The relevance inferencing task was adapted from Schulze et al. (2013). Following 
Schulze et al., (2020), we only used six rather than eight vignettes in order to have time 
to run our additional measures. We therefore selected five of the eight original vignettes 
(milk, dog’s lead, cups, knife, toothpaste) and added a vignette in which children chose 
between sunglasses and a scarf (see Appendix B in supplemental materials), which was 
also included in the study by Schulze and Buttelmann (2021).1 Instead of using live pup-
pets, we followed Schulze and Buttelmann (2021) by presenting children with video-
recorded interactions between a ‘King’ and ‘Princess’ puppet followed by a screen in 
which the child was asked to point to the item (out of two options) that the final speaker 
wanted (e.g. ‘Can you touch the one the King wants?’). Each vignette was presented in 
PsychoPy v. 1.83.04 (Peirce, 2007) and the audio-recordings were of a male and a female 
speaker of southern British English using child-directed speech.
We developed four script orders for the purposes of counterbalancing. The position of 
the target object and whether the king or princess uttered the key statement was counter-
balanced both within and across script orders. Across script orders we also counterbal-
anced which object (e.g. cereal vs toast) was the target for a particular vignette. The 
target object was never on the same side of the screen more than twice in a row. The four 
script orders were fairly evenly distributed over the final sample of children (order 1 = 
22.5%, order 2 = 27.5%, order 3 = 30%, and order 4 = 20%).
Relevance inferencing procedure
Warm-up. Each child first participated in four binary-choice warm-up trials during 
which they were given feedback if they pointed to the incorrect option. (Children were 
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not excluded based on incorrect performance during the warm-up.) In the first two warm-
up trials, children had to complete two easy forced-choice trials (e.g. ‘Can you touch the 
one where she is eating the banana/cutting the banana’ or ‘Can you touch the one where 
she is kicking/catching the ball’). For the second two warm-up trials, children were intro-
duced to the two puppet characters (King and Princess) and these two trials were struc-
tured identically to the test trials except that they involved literal language interpretation 
with no ambiguity. For example, in the final warm-up trial, the King asked, ‘Do you 
want your car or your bouncy ball’ and the Princess replied, ‘I want the car’. The child 
was then asked to touch the object that the Princess wanted (car vs ball).
Relevance inferencing test trials. Following this, the children were told that they would see 
some short films about a day in the life of the two puppet characters (Princess and King) 
and that they would sometimes have to help them out. Thus, each child first saw the 
vignette about breakfast and the sixth and final vignette always involved ‘going to bed’. 
No feedback was given for the test trials.
Theory of Mind assessment. The quintessential measure of Theory of Mind is often con-
sidered to be whether children understand that another person may hold a false belief. 
For our target age (3.5–4 years), it is well-established that the majority of children fail 
measures of false belief understanding (see, for example, Wellman & Liu, 2004). How-
ever, the ability to understand that others have different desires, perspectives, and knowl-
edge has its roots much earlier in development.
Wellman and Liu Theory of Mind Scale. We administered Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
scale, since it includes measures of the earlier-developing abilities of an understanding 
of diverse desires and knowledge (see Tomasello, 2008, for discussion). This scale starts 
with simpler forms of Theory of Mind, namely the understanding that others may like 
different things to oneself (Diverse Desires). It also assesses Knowledge Access (i.e. the 
understanding that you cannot ‘know’ the location of an object unless you have seen it), 
as well as Diverse Beliefs, where the protagonist believes an object is in a different loca-
tion to the child but neither knows the true location. We also included the ‘Contents False 
Belief’ task from Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale.
In our assessment, we included all four of the above sub-tests (although the procedure 
for Knowledge Access was modified slightly in line with Pratt & Bryant, 1990: Study 
1).2 We did not use Wellman and Liu’s (2004) False Belief Location nor their Apparent 
Emotion tasks since they would be extremely difficult for our age group.
Theory of Mind ‘Penny-Hiding’ task. To assess children’s ability to understand that 
another person may have differing perspectives from one’s own, we also administered 
the ‘Penny-hiding’ task, which has previously been used to assess Theory of Mind in pre-
schoolers (Hughes & Ensor, 2005) and autistic children (Baron-Cohen, 1992).
For this task, the experimenter hid a coin behind her back and then brought both hands 
forward keeping the coin hidden and asked the child to guess which hand the coin was 
in. This was carried out three times in total. Then the experimenter told the child that it 
was his or her turn to hide the coin. The child received one point for putting both hands 
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behind his or her back, an additional point for bringing both hands forward and a further 
point if the coin remained hidden until the experimenter guessed which hand it was in.
Additional measures
Language abilities. To assess children’s formal language abilities, the ‘Sentences Struc-
tures’ sub-test of the CELF-P (Wiig et al., 2006) was administered. Here, children were 
required to point to the correct picture (out of four) that corresponded to the experi-
menter’s statement. For example, ‘Point to: the boy is being chased by his cat’.
Real-world knowledge. To assess real-world knowledge, we administered the ‘Informa-
tion’ sub-test of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI; 
Wechsler, 2012), during which children were asked a series of increasingly complex 
questions such as ‘What do people use to stay dry in the rain?’
Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale. Parents completed the eight-item Mindful Con-
versational Difficulties Scale (De Rosnay et al., 2014). None of the items assess under-
standing of implicature or indirect speech but this questionnaire does assess pragmatic 
language more broadly. It includes items such as ‘Does the child adapt appropriately to 
conversing with different people in varied social situations (e.g. speaks differently to a 
classmate than the School Principal)?’ Parents respond on a five-point scale ranging 
from ‘very much less difficulty/[skill]’ to ‘very much more difficulty/[skill] than a typi-
cal child this age’. Four items are reverse-scored. All eight items are included in the main 
text of de Rosnay et al. (2014).
Coding and reliability
In the relevance inferencing task, a trial was scored as one if the child pointed to the cor-
rect object and zero if the child pointed to the incorrect object. If a child pointed to both 
objects, this item was removed from analysis3 (and for this reason, proportion scores 
were used). The data from five children (12.5% of the data) were coded by a second rater, 
blind to the original codes. There was perfect agreement between the raters for all trials 
for all five children (κ = 1.00).
The children’s performance on the additional measures was coded following the test 
script. For all Theory of Mind measures, the data from five children (12.5% of the data) 
were coded by a second rater, blind to the original codes. There was perfect agreement 
between the raters for all trials for all five children.
Results
The full anonymised datasets are available on the Open Science Framework web pages 
here: https://osf.io/wcg5p/?view_only=3d6f9f5eb33742959bbc2516d7119405. For an 
overview of the descriptive statistics pertaining to each task, see Table 1.
Overall, children pointed to the correct response 69% of the time, which was above 
chance, t(39) = 6.39, p < .001. Our main research question was whether individual dif-
ferences in relevance inferencing can be explained by children’s Theory of Mind, their 
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formal-language abilities and/or the children’s real-world knowledge. As can be seen in 
the correlation matrix presented as Table 2, children’s performance in the relevance 
inferencing task related to their real-world knowledge (r = .498, p = .001) and their 
performance in the ‘Penny-Hiding’-ToM-task (r = .331, p = .037), but no other measure 
of Theory of Mind.
RQ1: cognitive correlates of relevance inferencing. We then entered all variables of the cor-
relational analyses into a direct entry linear regression model with children’s performance 
in the relevance inferencing task as the outcome variable (see Table 3). This led to a sig-
nificant model, F(5, 31) = 3.75, p = .009, and accounted for 27.7% of the variance.
As can be seen from Table 3, only real-world knowledge was a significant predictor; it 
accounted for 18% unique variance as assessed by sr2. Multi-collinearity was not a con-
cern (tolerance for all > .7). The same pattern of results was found when comparing the 
full model with models in which one of these factors was removed. That is, when age was 
removed from the full model, this did not lead to a significant difference, F = 1.60, p = 
.22, and the model itself retained significance, p = .007, adjusted R2 = .26. When formal 
language (CELF-P ‘Sentence Structures’ sub-test – a measure of sentence comprehen-
sion) was removed, this also did not lead to a significant difference, F = 1.02, p = .32, 
and the model itself retained significance, p = .006, adjusted R2 = .27. Similarly, when 
the Wellman and Liu Theory of Mind measure was removed, this also did not lead to a 
significant difference, F = 1.29, p = .27, and the model itself retained significance, p = 
.007, adjusted R2 = .27. When the Theory of Mind ‘Penny Hiding’ task was removed, this 
also did not lead to a significant difference, F = 2.73, p = .12 and the model was signifi-
cant (p = .012), accounting for 24% of variance. In contrast, when real-world knowledge 
was removed from the model, this did lead to a significant difference, F = 8.73, p = .006, 
and the model itself was no longer significant, p = .12, adjusted R2 = .10.
RQ2: ecological validity of lab-based measures. Our second research question addressed the 
ecological validity of our relevance inferencing task. Using Pearson’s R, we found that 
the correlation of children’s relevance inferencing performance and the parental report of 
children’s everyday communication (Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale) 
approached significance, r = .301, p = .059. In line with the findings for our relevance 
Table 1. Overview of the children’s performance in the tasks of Study 1.
Construct Task Mean (SD) Max poss. score
Relevance inferencing .69 (.19) 1.00
Theory of mind Wellman and Liu Scale Sum-score 2.5 (.8) 4
Penny-Hiding Task 1.9 (1.1) 3
Formal language CELF-P ‘Sentence structures’ 14.8 (3.7) 22
Real-world knowledge WPPSI ‘Information’ sub-test 14.7 (3.9) 29
Daily pragmatic skills Mindful Conversational Difficulties 
Parental questionnaire
28.4 (3.6) 40
CELF-P: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals Preschool; SD: standard deviation; WPPSI: Wechsler 
Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence.
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inferencing measure, the Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale did not correlate 
with age, r = .20, p = .21, the Wellman and Liu Theory of Mind measure, r = .034, p = 
.833, nor the Theory of Mind ‘Penny Hiding’ task, r = –.07, p = .65. However, it did 
correlate both with real-world knowledge, r = .42, p = .009, and formal language 
(CELF-P ‘Sentence Structures’; r = .32, p = .045).
Discussion
Study 1 found that individual differences in children’s relevance inferencing abilities 
were not reliably related to their Theory of Mind-capacities (as measured with tasks 1–4 
from the Wellman and Liu scale, Wellman & Liu, 2004, and the penny hiding task) or 
their formal language abilities (sentence comprehension). In contrast, real-world knowl-
edge (as measured by the ‘Information’ sub-test of the WPPSI, Wechsler, 2012) 
accounted for 18% of the variance of children’s relevance inferencing performance. 
Finally, a medium-sized correlation (of borderline statistical significance) between the 
relevance inferencing task and parental ratings of children’s everyday communication 
suggested the lab-based relevance inferencing tasks may be a reasonably valid assess-
ment of childhood pragmatic ability.
While the correlation between real-world knowledge and inferencing in this study 
certainly suggests it might be a limiting factor for many children, the items on the 
Table 2. Correlation matrix showing relationships between the variables assessed in Study 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Relevance inferencing −  
2. Age in months (N = 40) .11 −  
3. Theory of mind (Wellman & Liu) (N = 40) −.18 −.09 −  
4. Theory of mind (Penny-Hiding) (N = 40) .33* .01 −.02 −  
5. Formal language (CELF-P ‘Sentence Structures’) (N = 39) .21 .17 .10 −.05 −  
6. Real-world knowledge (WPPSI ‘Information’) (N = 38) .50** .50** −.05 .23 .20 −
CELF: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-Preschool.
WPPSI: Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence.
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 3. Regression analysis for Study 1.
Variable Beta SE t sr2
Age (in months) −.21 .02 1.27 .03
Theory of mind Wellman and Liu scale −.16 .03 −1.14 .03
Theory of mind Penny-Hiding Task .24 .02 1.65 .05
Formal language (CELF-P ‘Sentence Structures’) .15 .01 1.01 .02
Real-world knowledge (WPPSI ‘Information‘) .50 .01 2.96** .18
CELF-P: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – Preschool; SE: standard error; WPPSI: Wechsler 
Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence.
sr2 = squared part correlation.
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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standardised tests of world knowledge did not relate directly to the experimental items 
on the inferencing test. Therefore, our primary aim in Study 2 was to examine the influ-
ence of the specific world knowledge required in the relevance inferencing task by 
experimentally manipulating it prior to assessment of inference (RQ1). Since we had 
not found a relationship between sentence comprehension and relevance inferencing in 
Study 1, we explored whether there might be a relationship between relevance inferenc-
ing and a different measure of formal language; in Study 2, we replaced the ‘Sentence 
Structures’ sub-test with the ‘Word Structure’ sub-test of the CELF-P, which measures 
expressive morpho-syntax, a domain in which there is rapid growth in this age group.
To answer our second key research question (RQ2), we also repeated the use of the 
parent questionnaire to assess validity.
Study 2
Method
Participants. We tested 39 monolingual English-speaking children in the Kent Child 
Development Unit. Five children were excluded in total. Four of these were excluded 
because they showed a side bias in the test trial phase and the final child was excluded 
because the parents indicated a referral for a suspected developmental disorder. Two 
additional children indicated they did not wish to complete testing. The final sample was 
thus 32 children aged between 41 and 47 months (Mean age = 44.5 months, SD = 2.0), 
of whom 15 were boys. The children were assigned to one of two conditions (‘Priming’ 
vs ‘Control’). The two conditions did not differ from one another in terms of chronologi-
cal age, gender, formal language scores (performance on the ‘Word Structure’ sub-test 
of the CELF-P) or the parent-completed Mindful Conversational Difficulties measure, as 
can be seen in Table 4.
Design, materials and set-up
All children were engaged in a warm-up and when they were comfortable talking to the 
experimenter, completed the ‘Word Structure’ sub-test of the CELF-P (Wiig et al., 2006). 
Based on this measure, children were assigned to one of the two conditions, so that the 
Table 4. Means (SD in brackets) for participant characteristics in Study 2.
Priming
(n = 16, 7 male)
Control 
(n = 16, 8 male)
 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p d
Chronological age (months) 44.06 (2.05) 44.88 (1.93) .26 0.40
Formal language (CELF-P 
‘Word Structure’) scaled 
scores
11.13 (2.13) 11.75 (1.88) .39 0.31
Parent report (Mindful 
Conversational Difficulties)
28.53 (3.94) 30.09 (3.76) .27 0.41
CELF: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals; SD: standard deviation.
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children in both conditions had equivalent formal language abilities. The Priming and the 
Control condition each contained 12 short silent video-clips. This was followed by the 
relevance inferencing task as described in Study 1 and then a ‘specific world knowledge’ 
post-test quiz.
Parents completed the Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale (de Rosnay et al., 
2014). The testing session lasted 35 minutes in total. Video and audio stimuli were pre-
sented in the same manner as for Study 1 (through PsychoPy and using the same screen, 
videos and sound files).
Procedure
Priming. Each child was shown 12 silent videos clips, with a total length of 5 minutes 
20 seconds. In the Priming condition, children saw videos relating to the items in the 
relevance inferencing task (e.g. a man pouring milk on cereal and then a different man 
putting butter on toast). In the Control condition, all the videos bore no relation to the 
relevance inferencing task. Rather, they involved colours, shapes and numbers (e.g. 
women running in a race and later holding up their position numbers; a woman placing 
colour cards on colour slots in a board game).
Relevance inferencing task. We used the same task as in Study 1.
Specific world knowledge. After the end of the relevance inferencing task, each child was 
asked the following ‘Real-world knowledge’ questions, which related to the actual items 
in the relevance inferencing task:
1. Do people like to drink out of dirty cups or out of clean cups?
2. Do people wear sunglasses when it is sunny or when it is cloudy?
3. Do people put milk on toast or on cereal?
4. Do people put leads on dogs or on cats?
5. Do people put toothpaste on hairbrushes or on toothbrushes?
6. Do people use knives to cut cakes or to cut biscuits?
Coding and reliability
In the relevance inferencing task, a trial was scored as one if the child pointed to the cor-
rect object and zero if the child pointed to the incorrect object. For 20% of the data, a 
second rater coded blind to the primary rater’s coding. Cohen’s Kappa showed perfect 
agreement among the coders (κ = 1.00).
The specific world knowledge was scored as one if the child gave the correct (conven-
tional) answer (i.e. said that people like to drink out of clean cups).
Results
The full anonymised dataset is available on OSF here: https://osf.io/wcg5p/?view_only=
3d6f9f5eb33742959bbc2516d7119405
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Main analyses
RQ1: does priming real-world knowledge improve relevance inferencing? Overall, children 
pointed to the correct response 74.5% (SD = 18.5) of the time, which was above chance, 
t(31) = 7.51, p < .001. Our first research question was whether priming real-world 
knowledge would enhance children’s relevance inferencing abilities. Children in the 
Priming condition did not perform significantly better on relevance inferencing overall 
than the children in the Control condition (see Table 5). Moreover, priming did not 
appear to lead to an increased activation of the requisite real-world knowledge itself, as 
there was no significant difference between the Priming condition and the Control condi-
tion in the specific knowledge post-test (see Table 5).
RQ2: ecological validity of lab-based measures. Our second research question was whether 
children’s scores on a parent-rated questionnaire of their everyday communication 
related to their performance on relevance inferencing (i.e. ecological validity). In 
Study 2, we found that children’s relevance inferencing abilities were indeed strongly 
correlated with the parent-rated Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale, r = .514, 
p = .003.
Secondary analyses
Since there were no differences between our priming and control group, we pooled the 
data across groups to investigate relationships between age and relevance inferencing 
and also between expressive language (as assessed by the CELF-P ‘Word Structure’ sub-
test) and relevance inferencing. As can be seen in Table 6, expressive language was 
related and this showed a strong positive relationship overall with performance on the 
relevance inferencing task, r(32) = .47, p = .006.4
Combining Studies 1 and 2
To further investigate, the relationship between our relevance inferencing measure and 
the Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale, we combined the data for these two vari-
ables across our two studies. (Recall that the age groups are identical, recruited from and 
Table 5. Means (SD in brackets) for relevance inferencing and specific world knowledge task 
(Study 2).
Priming Control  
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tested in the same developmental lab and the two variables were presented in the same 
way to participants in the two studies.) Again, using Pearson’s R, we found a significant 
relationship between the two variables, r = .41, p < .001.
Discussion
In this study, we asked whether priming the world knowledge required in the relevance 
inferencing task would enhance children’s performance in this task given that Study 1 
found that real-world knowledge correlated with children’s inferencing abilities. We 
found that the children’s performance in the Priming condition did not differ from that of 
children in the Control condition. Thus, supporting world knowledge seemingly did not 
influence children’s relevance inferencing in this study. However, we also found that 
priming this knowledge did not result in differences in the knowledge of children in 
either condition. That is, the priming did not lead greater accuracy on a test of the rele-
vant real-world knowledge. Since the prime was not effective as intended, we cannot 
know whether promoting real-world knowledge would indeed promote inferencing. 
Given that the vignettes of the relevance inferencing task were designed to age-appropri-
ately match children’s knowledge, future research should address this question further by 
constructing vignettes that call on knowledge only just within or slightly beyond the 
children’s current state of knowledge and then manipulating this by giving the children 
the relevant information through priming.
A second question addressed the ecological validity of our paradigm. In Study 2, we 
found that parental ratings of children’s communication strongly correlated with their 
relevance inferencing abilities. The fact that parent ratings were associated with the lab 
measure in both studies suggests that the communication task developed by Schulze 
et al. (2013) does tap important real-life pragmatic skills of young children.
General discussion
We carried out two studies using video-based vignettes followed by forced-choice 
measures to examine how young monolingual, typically developing preschool children 
compute relevance inferences. Our first research question was which key cognitive 
abilities are related to individual differences in the relevance inferencing abilities in 
young children. In Study 1, we found that real-world knowledge explained variance in 
children’s performance on the relevance inferencing task. While one measure of the 
Table 6. Correlation matrix for Study 2.
Age in months Formal language (CELF 
word structure) raw scores
Relevance inferencing .06 .47**
Formal language (CELF ‘Word 
Structure’) raw scores
.31†  
CELF: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals.
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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perspective-taking component of Theory of Mind (the ‘Penny Hiding Task’) was cor-
related with relevance inferencing, neither this, the other theory of mind measure nor 
the language comprehension measure (CELF-P ‘Sentence Structures’) were significant 
predictors in our regression analysis. In Study 2, a different measure of formal lan-
guage (CELF-P Word Structure) did predict relevance inferencing.
Our second research question was whether parental assessment of children’s conver-
sation skills in daily life, as assessed by the Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale, is 
related to their in-lab performance in the relevance inferencing task. In Study 1, the 
relationship between the Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale and relevance infer-
encing approached significance. In Study 2, this relationship was strong. Moreover, 
when data were collapsed over both studies, the relationship was significant, suggesting 
that lab-based relevance inferencing measures reflect real-life pragmatic abilities.
Regarding the relative role of cognitive and socio-cognitive factors, from the perspec-
tive of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 2002), it is perhaps surprising that we 
found no robust evidence that Theory of Mind relates to relevance inferencing. According 
to Relevance Theory, to understand indirect speech, a child must consider the communi-
cative intention. This certainly involves mentalising or Theory of Mind at some level as 
the correct interpretation requires the listener to consider the perspective of the speaker 
in some manner.
That said, as Sperber and Wilson (2002) themselves point out, a consideration of com-
munication intentions may not require that a listener accesses all aspects of Theory of 
Mind. There is certainly no logical reason why relevance inferencing should require an 
understanding of false belief, for example. Furthermore, there are many reasons why a 
child may be aware that there is an intended, relevant meaning but nonetheless not alight 
on what the exact intended meaning is. To give one example, at the most basic level, if a 
child asks a forced-choice question such as ‘Do you want cereal or toast?’ and receives 
in response neither a direct reference to cereal nor a direct reference to toast, this might 
lead to the realisation that a response such as ‘there’s no milk’ is likely to relate in some 
manner to the child’s question. If, however, the child’s family does not eat cereal with 
milk, he or she may still nonetheless be at a loss as to the intended meaning (see Schulze 
& Buttelmann, 2021, for discussion).
It is worth noting that the Theory of Mind ‘Penny hiding’ measure, while not a signifi-
cant predictor in the regression analysis, was correlated with relevance inferencing. 
However, unexpectedly, it was not correlated with the other measure of Theory of Mind. 
Future research should explore – with a larger sample size – relationships between 
Theory of Mind and pragmatic development using multiple measures of perspective-
taking, understanding of knowledge, false belief understanding and perhaps also non-
verbal measures of communicative intention reading (for the latter, see, for example, 
Bohn et al., 2019; Schulze & Tomasello, 2015).
When it comes to formal language (vocabulary, morpho-syntax), we would also need 
further research to clarify mixed findings. On one hand, in Study 1, we did not find a 
relation between relevance inferencing and children’s sentence comprehension, as meas-
ured by the ‘Sentence Structures’ sub-test of the CELF-P (although the latter did corre-
late with the parental questionnaire about the child’s naturalistic verbal social 
communication more generally). On the other hand, in Study 2, we did find a significant 
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relationship between expressive language (morpho-syntax) and relevance inferencing. 
Our pilot study (see Appendix A in supplemental materials) also found a significant rela-
tionship between expressive language (CELF-5 ‘Formulated Sentences’) and relevance 
inferencing, albeit, using a much more complex and linguistically demanding relevance 
inferencing task.
One difficulty with interpreting these conflicting findings for formal language is 
that all these standardised measures are to reflect several interrelated aspects of for-
mal language which are presumably implicated in relevance inferencing. These 
include sentence processing speed, depth of semantic knowledge and the speed with 
which relevant associations can be accessed. We, therefore, suggest that further 
exploration of the role of all these aspects of language processing is necessary before 
firm conclusions can be drawn. A first step might be to test whether expressive lan-
guage measures are reliably more closely associated with relevance inferencing than 
receptive language measures.
Finally, children’s general level of real-world knowledge was a significant predictor 
of relevance inferencing in Study 1. This seems reasonable since, for most relevance 
inferences, specific real-world knowledge is required. That is, one cannot determine the 
communicative intent of ‘there’s no milk’ in response to ‘do you want cereal or toast for 
breakfast’ without knowing that we put milk on cereal. Moreover, the findings regarding 
the important role of real-world knowledge are in line with those for other domains of 
pragmatic development, including metaphor comprehension, which depends heavily on 
understanding of the semantic domains being aligned (Winner, 1988). For example, even 
3-year-olds show a surprising grasp of novel metaphors, if they have already acquired 
the world knowledge and vocabulary needed to access the intended meaning (e.g. 
Pouscoulous & Tomasello, 2020; see also Winner, 1988).
Of course, it may also be that the significant influence of real-world knowledge found 
in Study 1 could be due to some other – as yet untapped – characteristic. However, real-
world knowledge not only related to our lab-based measure of relevance inferencing in 
Study 1 but also to the more general parent report of children’s everyday pragmatic abili-
ties. Thus, Study 1 suggests that a lack of general knowledge across the board is a sub-
stantial stumbling block for some children when making relevance inferences.
In Study 2, we sought to test the causal role of real-world knowledge in drawing (or 
failing to draw) relevance inferences by manipulating the availability of the specific real-
world knowledge required. Unfortunately, though, this experimental manipulation 
appears not to have been successful. This could be because the vignettes that we used to 
assess children’s relevance inferencing were designed to match their real-world knowl-
edge and thus, the children were already at ceiling in terms of potential priming effects. 
Alternatively, it could be that priming might be more effective if we had used language 
to highlight relevant aspects of the priming videos and/or if the priming videos had been 
a little more exciting and engaging. In the absence of a successful manipulation of real-
world knowledge in this study, future studies should attempt to assess the role of real-
world knowledge through an alternative design, perhaps by also including a range of 
vignettes for which children this age have not yet usually required the requisite knowl-
edge (so that they need to rely on the experimentally provided world knowledge to draw 
the correct inferences).
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Conclusion
This article is the first to empirically demonstrate that lab-based measures of relevance 
inferencing are reflective of children’s pragmatic abilities ‘in the wild’ (c.f. Holtgraves, 
1997: Study 6, for adults). Individual differences in the lab-based measure were not 
clearly associated with individual differences in Theory of Mind. The role of formal 
language warrants further investigation. Performance in the relevance inferencing task 
was associated with individual differences in children’s general real-world knowledge. 
Future experimental work is required to test the direction of causality here.
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Notes
1. Certain vignettes (e.g. tram vs car) could not be used for cultural reasons. Other vignettes in 
the original study had objects (e.g. jigsaw vs board game) which were difficult to recognise 
on the screen.
2. The knowledge-access task was modified slightly (see Pratt & Bryant, 1990: Study 1), such 
that one figure ‘lifts’ a box whereas the other ‘looks in’ the box and the child is then asked 
who knows what is in the box.
3. Only one child did this for one item in Study 1.
4. A linear regression analysis found the same pattern of results. CELF ‘Word Structure’ raw 
score, Beta = .501, SE = .01, t = 2.93, p = .007.
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